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Abstract
Inheritances, divorces or liquidations of companies require that a
common asset is divided among the entitled parties. Legal methods
usually consider the market value of goods, while fair division proce-
dures take into account the parties’ preferences expressed as cardinal
utilities. We combine the two practices to define two procedures that
optimally allocate goods with market values to people with preferences.
1 Introduction
The theory of fair division dates back to the end of the second world war. It
was devised by a group of Polish mathematicians, Hugo Steinhaus, Bronisaw
Knaster and Stefan Banach, who used to meet in the Scottish Caf in Lvov
(see [12], [19] and [20]. For an account of the many results that followed,
we refer to the books by Brams and Taylor [7] and Moulin [14] and, more
recently, the review papers of Bouveret, Chevaleyre and Maudet [6], Moulin
[15], Procaccia[18] and Thomson [22].
Many methods, including the Adjusted Winner procedure by Brams and
Taylor [7], rely on point allocation methods. Quoting the Wikipedia page
for the Adjusted Winner procedure:
∗The author would like to thank all the Invited Speakers to the “De Aequa Divisione”
workshop which took place in Rome, May 23–25, 2019: Anna Bogomolnaia, Steven Brams,
Markus Brill, Daniela Di Cagno, Edith Elkind, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Je´roˆme Lang, Juan D.
Moreno Ternero, Herve´ Moulin, Antonio Nicolo´, Fedor Sandomirskiy, William Thomson.
They all provided a precious feedback during the presentation of of this work at an early
stage. Additional thanks go to Herve` Moulin for an afternoon conversation in his office in
Glasgow in May 2018, which in turn lead to a fruitful email exchange. All mistakes are
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Each player is given the list of goods and an equal number of
points to distribute among them. He or she assigns a value to
each good and submits it sealed to an arbiter.
When dealing with the division of a patrimony, however, we note that when
parties allocate points to items to express their likes and dislikes, the mar-
ket value of the disputed items involved cannot be ignored. This happens,
among other causes, because if no agreement between the parties is found,
items can always be sold to third parties, and the collected money will be
shared between the parties. Therefore, when an agent allocates points to a
good, two pieces of information are conveyed:
• The degree of pleasantness/unpleasantness of the item for the agent
• The market value of the good.
We will disentangle to the two effects by proposing alternative ways for
expressing cardinal utilities:
1. Utility is expressed by bids: How much an agent would be willing to
pay for a good, or how much he would be willing to receive for a bad.
2. Since, the utility points convey two different pieces of information, two
different types of measurement are used for each item: a) An objective
market value agreed upon by all agents, and b) an individual rating
by each agent.
The first procedure is deeply indepted to the works of Eisenberg [10]
Gale [11], and, more recently, by Bogomolnaia, Moulin, Sandomirskiy and
Yanovskaya [4] and [5] regarding, among other things, the connection be-
tween the Nash solution of bargaining problems and equilbrium prices.
The second procedure has an important precedent in the Asset Divider
procedure by Bellucci [3] (see also [1]) that first combined preferences and
market value to output an allocation that is, in the intentions of the authors,
fair and equal in the market values of the bundles. This method
“uses a modified version of the Adjusted Winner algorithm de-
veloped by Brams and Taylor [7], to divide indivisible goods be-
tween two parties as fairly as possible. [...] Two sets of ratings
[...] symbolise how important the item is to the party. [While]
Asset Divider also accepts the current monetary value of each
item in dispute”
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While the essential data processed by their method and ours may be
similar, the way it is processed is inherently different. We list the main
differences:
1. Asset Divider uses a step-by-step procedure in which items are al-
located once during the process and the allocation is final, without
checking whether the whole allocation is optimal in the end. Our pro-
cedures allocates all goods at once, making sure that the allocation is
optimal under well-defined criteria.
2. Asset Divider looks for an acceptable solution. In Belluccis [3] words:
Our goal is to provide feasible suggested solutions to the
conflict that are acceptable to the user, which for our pur-
poses does not involve searching for optimal solutions as in
Pareto optimisation. We have found such techniques are
difficult to use in our domain. The best we can arrive at
computationally fair solutions is to ensure are solutions are
acceptable (i.e. approximately optimal or fair solutions).
Our goal instead is to overcome the difficulties highlighted above and
frame the problem in a solid mathematical background that allows the
inclusion of the most recent scientific advances in the field of mathe-
matics, economics and computer science. Our procedure uses clear cut
optimization techniques that are easy to use in the current domain.
3. By properly setting our optimality criterion, we address (and over-
come) an impossibility result which states that divisions providing
equal market shares may result in too many split items. Our proce-
dure always guarantees the minimal number of split items, which is
given by the number of agents involved in the division, minus 1 (and
it therefore reduces to 1 when 2 agents are involved)
4. The two procedures satisfy different properties. The Asset Divider
procedure enjoys a scale invariance property: if the all the ratings by
a player are multiplied by a constant, the outcome is the same. Our
procedure is translation invariance: If all the ratings are increased, or
decreased by the same amount, say a star, the outcome is unchanged.
This property has proved very easy to convey to the audiences of
specialists in the legal area of research.
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5. Last but not least, our procedure works for any number of agents. The
Asset Divider procedure works only for two agents.
The procedures have been set up while working for the CREA project: a
two-year project funded by the E-Justice program of the European Union,
which saw the collaboration of law, mathematics and computer science re-
searchers, together with Stakeholder Associations, from eight countries in
the European Union.
2 Notation and Assumptions
We consider a (finite) set of q valuable items A (which we refer to as goods)
to be divided among a (finite) set N of n agents. The share of good a
assigned to agent i is denotes as zia ∈ [0, 1]. For each i ∈ N , the vector
zi =

zi1
zi2
...
ziq
 ∈ [0, 1]A
denotes agent i’s allocation. The entire allocation is grouped as a matrix z =
(z1, . . . , zn). Only one specimen per good is distributed and, since receiving
the good or part of it provides utility for at least an agent, allocations
that assign the entire good to one or more agents are considered. Those
allocations are called feasible and the set of such allocations is denoted as
Φ(N,A) =
{
z :
∑
i
zia = 1 for every a ∈ A
}
Typically, no pair of agents values the same good equally. The degree of
appreciacion for good a ∈ A by agent i ∈ N is described by a non negative
number uia ≥ 0, conveniently arranged in vectors ui = (ui1 . . . , uiq)T ∈ RA+
and then in a matrix u = (u1, . . . , un). A division problem is then fully
characterized by the triplet Q = (N,A, u). We assume now that utilities
are addiitve (the utility of receiving a bundle of goods equals the sum of the
utilities of the single goods) and linear (the utility of receiving the fraction
of a good equals the same fraction of the utility for receiving the good
in its entirety). Consequently, a feasible allocation z will give a utility of
Ui(z) = ui · zi =
∑
a ziauia for agent i ∈ N . Let U(z) = (U1(z), . . . , Un(z))T
be the utility profile corresponding to an allocation and let U(N,A, u) be
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the set of utility profiles corresponding to feasible allocations. Notice that
the utililty of receiveing the entire asset need not be the same for all the
agents. In other words, utilities are not normalized.
2.1 Which allocation?
What makes an allocation fair? The question does not come with an easy
answer, and this is what makes the whole topic appealing. Often, the pro-
posed allocation stands out as the, possibly unique, solution of a social
welfare function which measures the agents’ global satisfaction. Among the
many proposals, two functions convey an idea of fairness particularly well,
and the have resurfaced over and over in the specific literature for theory
and applications:
• The Egalitarian solution (which derives from the Egalitarian Equiva-
lent allocation by Pazner and Schmeidler [17]) defined as
zE ∈ argmax
z∈Φ(N,A)
min U¯i(z), (1)
where U¯i(z) =
Ui(z)∑
a uia
is the normalized utility for agent i ∈ N . The
solution name comes from the fact that, under mild conditions such
as the requirement that every good has some positive value for every
agent, i.e. uia > 0 for every i ∈ N and a ∈ A, it turns out (see Corollary
5.8 in [8]) that the solution guarantees equal normalized utility for all
agents, namely
U¯i(z) = U¯j(z) for every i, j ∈ N (2)
• The Competitive/Nash solution (after Nash [16]) defined as
zN ∈ argmax
z∈Φ(N,A)
∏
Ui(z) (3)
Nash introduced this solution in the context of bargaining problems.
The solution is also referred to as competitive because it can be ob-
tained as a competitive equilibrium in the exchange economy where
each agent is endowed with an equal amount of money. We will return
to this notion in a later section.
As we may expect, no criterion prevails over the other. First of all, we
notice that both solutions satisfy the following invariance by scale property:
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suppose that the utility profile of each agent is multiplied (scaled) by some
constant λi > 0 for every i ∈ N , i.e.,
u′ia = λiuia for every i ∈ N and a ∈ A
then (N,A, u) and (N,A, u′) yield the same solution sets.
In case of the Egalitarian solution, this is true because we are considering
normalized utilities in the objective function. For the Nash/Competitive
one, we have that U ′i(z) = λiUi(z), and thus the objective functions of the
two problems Q = (N,A, u) and Q′ = (N,A, u′) simply differ by a constant.
The Egalitarian and the Competitive/Nash solutions share other impor-
tant properties, such as:
• Fair Share Guarantee: everyone is guaranteed at least her fair share
of the entire asset. In formulas
Ui(z) ≥
∑
a uia
n
for every i ∈ N (4)
• Efficiency: The allocation implements an efficient utility profile, a vec-
tor U of utility values that is not Pareto dominated, i.e. it cannot be
improved upon, agent by agent, by another allocation. In formulas
U(z) ≤ U ′(z) and U ′(z) ∈ U(N,A, u) =⇒ U(z) = U ′(z)
The two solutions differ in the fulfillment of other important properties: As
already stated, the egalitarian solution, under mild conditions, satisfies (2),
while the Competitive/Nash one typically fails the same test. Conversely,
the latter always satisfies
• No Envy: ui · zi ≥ ui · zj for all i, j.
In words, every agent values the received bundle of items at least as
much as the bundles assigned to the other agents.
The egalitarian solution always satisfies the same property, but may fail to
do so when the number of agents increases to 3 or more (see [9]).
The comparison may continue and we refer to [5] and [15] for a recent and
thorough comparison of the two solution in the linear setting adopted here
and in more general frameworks. The Competitive/Nash solution enjoys
many solidarity properties such as Resource Monotonicity (A more valuable
asset should correspond to a better share for all agents) and Population
Monotonicity (A smaller number of competing agents should correspond to
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a better share for all the remaining agents). On the other hand, the Egal-
itarian solution is more intuititve and performs better in specific contexts
such as the division of bads. More than championing any of the two so-
lutions a priori, we will show that a solution may stand out based on the
assumptions and the data available for any instance.
All the above definitions and results hold for agents having equal impor-
tance, but can be asily adapted to situations where agents are endowed with
different entitlements or weights wi > 0, i ∈ N .
3 The procedure without agreed upon market val-
ues
We begin with a division procedure where agents do not have an agreement
on the market value of the goods to be assigned, because they tried, but
have not reached an agreement or, more simply, because the topic has not
been discussed yet.
The procedure requires the intervention of a mediator for the preliminary
steps: the definition of a range of reasonable bids for every single good and
a budget that the agents will use to make bids on every good of the asset.
Notice that, if the agents are in good terms with each other, they may jointly
proceed with these preliminary steps, thus making the intervention of the
mediator unnecessary.
The main idea of the procedure is to ask the agents to make bids on all
the goods using the available budget. The bid on a good should reflect the
liking of that good, with a higher, lower resp., offer reflecting a willingness
to get, renounce resp., the item. If bia denoted the bid of agent i for good
a, we will equate the utility of the good to this bid
uia = bia for every i ∈ N and a ∈ A (5)
An important feature of the procedure is that the bids are private and
should not be communicated among the agents. Agents should therefore
evaluate the goods exclusively according to their own bids. In this per-
spective, an important feature that the proposed solution should possess is
No Envy. The Competitive/Nash solution becomes the natural candidate
for this procedure. There is, however, another no less important reason to
pick this solution: It defines equilibrium prices which can be posted (as op-
posed to the private bids) and according to which the bundle received by
each agent coincides with the rational choice to be made when she actually
spends one n-th of the total budget.
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The procedure works as follows:
“Fix Your Own Price” procedure
i. A mediator defines
a. An available budget B is given to each player
b. A range of reasonable offers for each good.
c. The mediator also decides whether to communicate these ranges to
the agents
ii. Each agent distributes the budget as reasonable bids over the goods.
The bids are not revealed to the other agents.
iii. The Competitive/Nash solution for divisible goods is computed
The definition of ranges for the bids, though not strictly necessary, is
useful for limiting the insurgence of strategic behavior: An agent who knows
that a good is particularly appreciated by other agents may be tempted to
make a null bid in order to save that part of the budget in its entirety
for other bids. The decision on whether to reveal the value of reasonable
bids to the agents is up to the mediator. On one hand, if agents know the
range they may better calibrate the bids. Knowing the range, however, may
induce the agents to place their bids on the bounds of the range and this
may be problematic – especially if more than one bid is placed on the upper
bound. In such a case, ties must be broken, and this greatly increases the
number of available solutions to choose from, up to a point where too many
alternatives make the choice hard. A reasonable range for good a may come
in the form of a finite interval [ba, ba] or an unbounded interval [ba,∞] in
which only the lower bound is specified.
In principle, imposing a common budget for all the agents would not be
necessary for the implementation of this procedure. In fact, each agent could
simply declare a personal bid for every good with no constraints over the
sum. The definition of a fixed budget (common or not), however, effectively
conveys the notion that raising (lowering, resp.) the bid on a good reduces
(increases, resp.) resources for bidding on other goods.
A simple way to determine the endpoints is the following: Fix a plausible
tentative value for each good, compute the budget as the sum of these values,
and define the interval of reasonable bids by decreasing and increasing (if
required) the value, say 30% below and above it, respectively.
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Our experience with putting the procedure in practice, reveal that agents
may find difficult to balance the bids so to use the whole budget or, con-
versely, they may find the amount insufficient to complete the bidding. In-
stead of manually adjusting the bids, which may alter the proportions, and
therefore the actual relevance of the goods, the system should provide a
scaling option that allows the bids to automatically adjust to the available
resources.
3.1 More ammunitions to the Nash solution
Some properties of the Nash solution have already been listed. The solution
guarantees no envy: each agent compares the received bundle with those
assigned to the other agents, and, according to the private bids, each agent
thinks she made the better deal. Moreover the solution is efficient (no ar-
rangement that globally improves the satisfaction of agents is possible) and
scale invariant: providing an agent with a larger budget will not make that
agent any better off. Among the other features of the solution, one is par-
ticularly suited in this context: The Nash solution coincides with a market
equilbrium allocation where agents spend a budget, equal for all of them,
on the goods priced in such a way that no good is over- or underdemanded.
The striking coincidence dates back to the works of Gale [11] and Eisenberg
[10]. This result has been recently elaborated on and extended to the cases
of allocation of liabilities/chores, denoted as bads, or to the mixed allocation
of goods and bads, by Moulin et al. in [5]. To highlight this dual definition,
the solution is now referred to as Competitive/Nash.
In the definition of the competitive equilibrium, it is assumed that all
budgets are set to one, with prices defined accordingly. An explicit formu-
lation for the equilibrium prices are given in the main theorem of [5]. When
utilities equate the bids, those prices can be suitable scaled to work with
individual budgets amounting to B/n:
pBa =
B
n
max
i∈N
bia
Ui
for every a ∈ A . (6)
The setting of these prices give an alternative explanation for the Nash
solution as a market situation with clearing prices. In fact, once the prices
have been posted, we may figure that agents act as follows:
a. Each agent has 1 n-th of the total budget
b. Each agent compares his bids with the prices and
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i. Rules out all the goods with price higher than the bid
ii. Among the goods with prices lower than the bid, he starts buying,
starting from the good with highest rebate (discount)
iii. Until the budget ends
The main Theorem in [5] allows us to conclude that, when prices are defined
by (6), all goods will be sold with no demand left unsatisfied, i.e. the market
clears, and the allocation coincides with the Nash solution.
In the above procedure, we assumed that no agent will ever buy goods at
prices higher than the bids. Moreover, prices are consistent with the initial
budget B. This is explained by the following result.
Proposition 1. The prices defined in (6) are such that, if agent follow the
market procedure, i) no agent will pay more than his bid and ii) the sum of
these prices equals the budget B.
Proof. According to Lemma 2 in [5], prices, when agents have budgets of 1
euro each, can be defined as
pa = max
i
bia
Ui
for every good a (7)
where Ui = Ui(z
N ) for every i ∈ N . Since each agent is asked to distribute
a budget B as bids over the goods. Ui will denote the “personal” value of
the goods (or shares) received. Since the CEEI/Nash solution satisfies the
Fair Share Guarantee, we have
Ui ≥ B
n
for every agent i (8)
When it comes to explaining the equilibrium prices, we may think of agents
having now a budget B/n to spend. Prices have to be scaled up accordingly.
pBa =
B
n
pa
Now, if i∗ ∈ argmax biaUi is one of the agents receiving good a in equilibrium,
by (8).
pBa =
B
n
pa = bi∗a
B
nUi∗
≤ bi∗a
which proves i). Regarding ii) we simply note that, by the clearing property
of the equilibrium market prices in the original setting∑
a∈A
pBa =
B
n
∑
a∈A
pa = B
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3.2 An application to inheritance
Most of the units working in the European project took care of the legal
aspects of the problem. These units listed 36 different concrete cases in the
areas of family law (inheritance and divorce) and company law (liquidation)
that could benefit from the tools being developed in this context. Here is
one of the inheritance cases submitted:
During his life, X was the owner of a land plot in a Seaside Town
with a building and garden with three flats: one on the ground
floor (90m2), one on the first floor (60m2) and one on the second
floor with a wonderful view of the shore and beach (60m2). All
flats were condominiums and were rented out. He also owned
another land plot in the Capital City with a building with three
flats; one on the ground floor (55m2), one on the first floor (55m2,
where X lived) and one on the second floor (45m2, but needs full
renovation). This second building was not condominium.
After death of person X he is succeeded by his sons, A, B and
C.
A is most interested in the ground floor because he operates
a mechanics workshop which is crucial for his livelihood. He
wouldnt mind getting another apartment either in the Capital
City or in a Seaside Town.
B already had a house so he was interested in the house in the
Seaside Town. He wants two flats, the one on the first floor but
especially the one on the second floor (this is his mayor priority).
C has a tourist agency and he wants all flats in the Seaside Town.
A mediator could provide a rough guess of the properties’ values based
on standard per sq. meter estimate ranges provided by real estate authori-
ties. The remarks on the properties’ conditions help position the pointwise
estimates within the range of possible values (k = ∗1000):
Table 1: Estimated goods’ market value for the inheritance application
Seaside Capital
Ground Fl. 1 Fl. 2 Ground Fl. 1 Fl. 2
180k 120k 130k 77k 80k 45k
11
The same mediator could set a budget of 630k Euros (the values listed
in the description actually sum up to 632k Euros, but we preferred to give
a rounder number) and could also set the minimum bids as the estimated
values decreased by 20%:
Table 2: Minimum bids for the inheritance case
Seaside Capital
Ground Fl. 1 Fl. 2 Ground Fl. 1 Fl. 2
144k 96k 104k 61k 64k 36k
The following bids are compatible with the preferences inferred by the
short description on the problem.
Table 3: The agents’ bids for the inheritance case
Seaside Capital Budget
Ground Fl. 1 Fl. 2 Ground Fl. 1 Fl. 2
A 170k 112k 123k 100k 80k 45k 630k
B 181k 132k 156k 61k 64k 36k 630k
C 200k 129k 140k 61k 64k 36k 630k
The Competitive/Nash solution is given by:
z =

S GF S F1 S F2 C GF C F1 C F2
A 0 0 0 1 1 1
B 0 0.68 1 0 0 0
C 1 0.32 0 0 0 0

Three arguments can be used to promote the solution among agents.
The allocation is:
1. Efficient: no allocation that simultaneously improves the utility of all
agents is possible;
2. Envy-free: Each agents receives the better share when goods are eval-
uated according to the personal bids;
3. An equilibrium from Equal Incomes: Prices can be defined that sup-
port the suggested solution as a market equilibrium.
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The results regarding envy-freeness can be summarized by the following
table, where the different valuations are described in the rows and the allo-
cations are reported in the columns:
Table 4: The solutions satisfies no envy
Allocations
A B C
Valuations
A 225k 191.3k 213.7k
B 161k 245.8k 223.2k
C 161k 218.7k 250.3k
The valuations of agent A are listed in the first row. That agent values
the three flats received as the sum of the respective bids: 100k, 80k and 45k,
yielding 225k Euros. Agent A values the bundles given to B (The second
floor and 68% of the first floor in the Seaside Town) and to C (The ground
floor and 32% of the first floor in the Seaside Town), 191.3k Euros and
213.7k Euros, respectively. Agent A has no reason to envy agent B or agent
C. A similar reasoning applies to the other two agents whose valuation of
the received bundle (bold in the table) exceeds that of the bundles assigned
to the other agents.
We remark that bids are personal and do not represent objective evalua-
tions. For this reason, a comparison between the values in the main diagonal
of Table 4 may induce some agents to complain over having obtained lower
values than other agents. In order to avoid any complaint, we recommend
that bids are kept private, and each agent has no access to everybody else’s
valuations.
To explain the solution as an equilibrium, we note that the procedure is
capable of computing the following prices for the properties:
Table 5: Equilibrium prices for the inheritance case
Seaside Capital
Total
GF Fl 1 Fl 2 GF Fl 1 Fl 2
Prices 174k 113k 133k 93.5k 74.5k 42k 630k
To explain the equilibrium we can envision the agents engaged to buy
the properties at the posted prices, each one possessing a budget of 210k
Euros, one third of the estimated total value of the whole asset. Each agent
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will orient his purchases based on the divergences between the personal bids
and the posted prices. For instance, Agent A’s comparison is shown in the
next table:
Table 6: Agent A’s rational behavior under the equilibrium prices
Seaside Capital
GF Fl 1 Fl 2 GF Fl 1 Fl 2
Prices 174k 113k 133k 93.5k 74.5k 42k
A’s bids 170k 112k 123k 100k 80k 45k
Discount 7 7 7 −6.5% −6.87% −6.67%
Agent A rules out all the flats in the Seaside Town, whose prices exceed
his own bids, and starts buying the apartment on the first floor in the Capital
City because it is the one with the highest discount, relative to his own bids.
He pays 74.5k Euros and has 135.5k Euros remaining as budget. He than
turns his attention to the apartment on the second floor and uses 42k Euros.
The budget decreases to 93.5k Euros. Just enough money to buy the ground
floor apartment in the same building.
A similar comparison is made by agent B, as shown in the next table:
Table 7: Agent B’s rational behavior under the equilibrium prices
Seaside Capital
GF Fl 1 Fl 2 GF Fl 1 Fl 2
Prices 174k 113k 133k 93.5k 74.5k 42k
B’s bids 181k 132k 156k 61k 64k 36k
Discount −3.86% −14.39% −14.74% 7 7 7
This agent first buys the apartment on the second floor in the Seaside
Town and, with the remaining budget he cannot buy a share of 68% of the
apartment on the first floor in the Seaside Town.
Finally, Agent C’s valuations are summarized in the next table
Agent C will therefore buy the ground floor apartment in the Seaside
Town, at the posted price of 174k Euros and the remaining budget will allow
him to buy the remaining 32% share of the first floor apartment in the same
building, that Agent B could not afford to buy.
This is an illustration of how the Nash solution can be obtained as a
market equilibrium via the posted prices mechanism.
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Table 8: Agent C’s rational behavior under the equilibrium prices
Seaside Capital
GF Fl 1 Fl 2 GF Fl 1 Fl 2
Prices 174k 113k 133k 93.5k 74.5k 42k
C’s bids 200k 129k 140k 61k 64k 36k
Discount −13% −12.4% −5% 7 7 7
4 The procedure with agreed upon market values
We now explore a second setting in which the goods’ market value is given
and it is accepted by the agents involved. Differences in the valuations
among the agents still exist and they will result in subjective modifications
of the market value of each single good, which may increase or decrease
depending on the degree of appreciation by every single agent.
Elicitation of preferences typically requires careful balance between the
precision in the specification of the agents’ priorities and the simplicity in
the definition of rules that can be understood by a vast audience of non-
specialists, with no background in matematics or economics.
The method that we propose supports the latter feature, while maintain-
ing, under some proper assumptions, a sufficient degree of the former. It
recurs to an ancient and intuitive method, which is knowing a recent revamp
in popularity: that of a rating system induced by the repetition of a given
symbol, typically a star. The method dates back to an 1820 guidebook by
Mariana Starke [21]. Since then it has been used by critics to grade artworks
(books, movies, theatrical performances,. . .) or by travellers or institutions
to evaluate facilities (hotels, restaurants,. . .). More recently, it has become
a popular method used by major internet goods and services retailers (such
as Amazon, eBay or TripAdvisor) to let customer provide feedback on their
consumption experience for other customers to make more informed deci-
sions. We are confident that such pervasivity should make every potential
user of the procedure at ease.
Typically, an odd number of symbols is adopted, with a median grade
denoting neutrality. In the context of fair division, a rating system could be
given the following interpretation.
We believe that a rating system with 5 levels is rich enough for most
purposes: it encompasses the 3 level system (an agent who only wants to
distinguish among appreciated (neutral, depreciated, resp.) goods could use
15
Table 9: An interpretation of the ratings
stars rating meaning
F 1 strongly prefers to leave the good
FF 2 mildly prefers to leave the good
FFF 3 neutral about the good
FFFF 4 mildly prefers to take the good
FFFFF 5 strongly prefers to take the good
a restricted rating of 5 stars (3 stars, 1 star, resp.).
Giving the maximum rating for a good, will certainly increase the chances
of receving that good, but it will not grant any ownership right about it.
This happens because other agents may give similar maximum ratings, but
most of all because there is no restriction on the total number of stars to
be assigned by a player over all the goods (other that the number of levels
adopted). Rather, an invariance principle should hold to encourage agents
in revealing a profile of preferences rather than abunding with the stars in
the vain hope of receiving a richer share than that of the others.
The notion of scale invariance, though sound in principle, is elusive in
its application. Each agent should be able to (mentally) scale up or down
a profile of prefences by a constant factor in order to be able to compare
different sets of utilities. In the case of a discrete range of ratings and, a
fortiori, with such a limited number of levels, the principle becomes impos-
sible to implement. We devise a formula for linking ratings to utilities in
which when the rating is median coincides with the market value, and each
star added or removed correspond to the multiplication or divison of that
market value by a constant factor. In fact, we will consider the following
formula valid for each agent i ∈ N and each good a ∈ A:
uia = K
ria−3 ·ma (9)
where ma is the market value of good a, ria is the rating by agent i of good
a and K > 1 is the constant multiplicative factor.
Instead of scale invariance, the rating system satisfies the following:
Translation invariance Adding or removing one star to the ratings of
all of the goods will not change the outcome.
The principle applies to fractions of stars, if these are allowed by the
system. To exemplify, according to translation invariance, the profiles in
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Table 10 yield the same outcome.
Table 10: First instance of translation invariance
Items Profile A Profile B Profile C
Town H. FF FFF FFFF
Country H. FFF FFFF FFFFF
Car F FF FFF
M. bike FFF FFFF FFFFF
Garage FF FFF FFFF
Considering a more extreme case, all of the profiles described in Table
11, indicate indifference over the goods.
Table 11: Second instance of translation invariance
Items Profile D Profile E Profile F
Town H. F FFF FFFFF
Country H. F FFF FFFFF
Car F FFF FFFFF
M. bike F FFF FFFFF
Garage F FFF FFFFF
In other words, adding too many stars will result in an expression of
indifference among goods. What counts, instead, is a right profiling, where
an agent is able to indicate which are the goods that she really cares for.
4.1 Which objective?
Once the utility of all the agents have been defined, we should pick an allo-
cation with the following properties: (i) It is fair in the Nash, Egalitarian or
in any other scale invariant optimality criterion, and (ii) it provides bundles
of equal market values (or proportional to the shares of entitlement) to te
agents. The following example shows the the fulfillment of both objectives
may come at a cost which is undue in situations where assets should be
divided in a neat way and the number of split items should be kept to a
minimum.
Example 1. Consider two agents: A and B who are dividing 4 Marylin
Monroe prints by Andy Warhol between themselves. The market value of
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the portraits is set to 100 dollars each, but each print has different back-
ground colors which modify the liking of the two agents. Here, the constant
multiplying factor is set to K = 1.1.
Table 12: The ratings for Example 1
Bkgnd color mv rA uA rB uB
1. Green 100 FFFFF 121 F 82.6
2. Blue 100 FFFFF 121 FFFFF 121
3. Pink 100 F 82.6 F 82.6
4. Grey 100 F 82.6 FFFFF 121
The following picture shows the range of utility values corresponding to
all possible allocations of the goods (known as Indivisual Pieces Set (IPS)
in Barbanel’s monograph [2]). As shown in Figure 1, by the symmetry of
this set and the indifference curves for both the Nash and the Egalitarian
objectives, a fair allocation must yield a utility level of 222.8 for both agents.
Figure 1: A geometrical descripion of Example 1
Such optimal level and an equal market value for the bundles received by
the two agents is achieved by the following allocation:
ze =
[ 1.Green 2.Blue 3.Pink 4.Grey
A 1 0.5 0.5 0
B 0 0.5 0.5 1
]
(10)
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This solution has two paintings equally split between the two agents. It is
fairly easy to show that no arrangement with at most one split painting
achieves the same level of utility for both agents, while maintaining an equal
market value for both agents.
The fact that in the example an allocation that is simultaneously fair
and assigning bundles of equal market value requires two items to be split is
at odds with one well known fact regarding the division of homogenous and
divisible goods, namely the fact that any Pareto efficient profile deriving
from the division of goods among n agents can be obtained by splitting at
most n − 1 goods. In Example 1, this fact implies that all points on the
Pareto efficient frontier (the thick border on the IPS in Figure 1) can be
obtained by splitting at most one good, and proves the following statement.
Proposition 2. For two agents, an allocation that:
i) Is equal in the market values
ii) Is fair in the Egalitarian or Nash criteria
iii) Splits at most one item
may fail to exist.
4.2 Our Proposal
Proposition 2 provides a strong argument for rejecting any procedure aiming
at satisfying fairness and perfect equality in market values, for instance by
searching a maximally fair allocation among those that return perfect equal-
ity in the market values by means of constrained optimization techniques.
The cost of indicating a solution with too many split items may prove too
high – especially in case of bitter disputes where the agents’ main goal is
to minimize the opportunities for contention after the division has been ar-
ranged (and each split item calls for an agreement between the involved
agents). We solve the dilemma by proposing the egalitarian allocation The
procedure works as follows:
“Price and Rate” procedure
i. A mediator defines:
a. The market value for each good;
b. The rate of appreciation for each additional star in the rating (The
parameter K > 1 in our model).
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ii. Each agents expresses a personal appreciation over each good with a
five-star rating scale.
iii. The Egalitarian solution is computed.
Our first simulations reveal that setting K = 1.1 is a reasonable choice,
and this can be set as the system default value.
In principle, equalizing the agents’ utilities may not seem the wisest
choice because it requires the comparison of interpersonal utility – a highely
debated and questioned principle. In the present situation, however, agents’
utilities are magnifications or contractions of the goods’ market values and
an allocation with equal (normalized) agents’ utilities yields bundles of ap-
proximately equal market values for everyone, exact equality being problem-
atic – as Example 1 shows. A more detailed analysis reveals that differences
in the bundles’ market values can be explained in terms of the agents’ sat-
isfaction per unit of monetary value received. More in detail: if an agents
gets a larger share than that of another agent in terms of market value, the
average rating of the former will be lower than that of the latter.
In order to make the agents’ ratings comparable, these have to be stan-
dardized. In fact, agents have no constraints over the total number of stars
to distribute over all goods (although, as explained above, abounding with
high ratings is a backfiring strategy), therefore, a standardization over a
central value is needed. We will not consider the common arithmetic mean,
but a value that will enable the interpersonal comparison of utilities.
Definition 1. We define the central rating for agent i ∈ N as the number
ρ¯i such that ∑
a∈AK
(ria−ρ¯i)ma∑
a∈Ama
= 1 (11)
The standardized rating of good a ∈ A for agent i ∈ N is defined by ria− ρ¯i,
and the standardized utility of good is K(ria−ρ¯i)ma.
When the standardized utility is used, receiving all goods guarantees
every agent an utility equal to the total market value of the whole asset.
The following result helps computing the average rating for each agent.
Proposition 3. For every agent i ∈ N ,
ρ¯i =
ln
(∑
a∈AK
riama
)− ln (∑a∈Ama)
lnK
(12)
where ln is the natural logarithm (with base e).
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Proof. By the properties of powers, equation (11) defining ρ¯ can be written
as:
1 =
∑
a∈A (K
ria/K ρ¯i)ma∑
a∈Ama
.
Multiplying both sides by K ρ¯i we get:
K ρ¯i =
∑
a∈AK
riama∑
a∈Ama
.
Taking logarithms on both sides, first with base K and then with base e, we
get
ρ¯i = logK
(∑
a∈AK
riama∑
a∈Ama
)
=
ln
(∑
a∈AK
riama
)− ln (∑a∈Ama)
lnK
.
last equality deriving from the properties of the logarithm and the change
of base formula.
Instead of assessing the overall (normalized) utility of an allocation, an
agent can evaluate two indices:
Definition 2. The market value µi(z) of the bundle received by agent i ∈ N
is defined as
µi(z) =
∑
a∈A
mazia i ∈ N (13)
and the average standardized utility of the bundle, u¯i(z), is defined as
u¯i(z) =
∑
a∈AK
(ria−ρ¯i)mazia
µi(z)
i ∈ N (14)
The following relationship holds
U¯i(z) =
u¯i(z)µi(z)∑
a∈Ama
i ∈ N (15)
An index that is easier to interpret than the average standardized utility
is the following:
Definition 3. The gain over the central rating for agent i is defined as:
r¯i(z) =
ln (u¯i(z))
lnK
i ∈ N (16)
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The following result clarifies the inverse relationship between the market
values and the average standardized rating – or utility for two agents.
Theorem 1. Suppose z∗ is an optimal egalitarian allocation and i, h ∈ N .
Then µi(z
∗)/wi > µh(z∗)/wh iff u¯i(z∗) < u¯h(z∗) iff r¯i(z∗) < r¯h(z∗). The
same holds true when all the inequalities are reversed, or they are replaced
by the equal sign.
Proof. If z∗ is an optimal egalitarian allocation, then
U¯i(z
∗)
wi
=
U¯h(z
∗)
wh
. (17)
Now, for any allocation z
U¯i(z) =
∑
a∈AK
(ria−3)mazia∑
a∈AK(ria−3)ma
=
=
∑
a∈AK
(ria−ρ¯i)mazia∑
a∈AK(ria−ρ¯i)ma
=
∑
a∈AK
(ria−ρ¯i)mazia∑
a∈Ama
(18)
The first equality is given by the definition of U¯i(z), the second equality is
obtained by multiplying numerator and denominator by (K)3−ρ¯i , and the
third inequality is a consequence of the definition of ρ¯i. Equations (17) and
(18) imply ∑
a∈AK
(ria−ρ¯i)maz∗ia
wi
=
∑
a∈AK
(rha−ρ¯h)maz∗ha
wh
. (19)
Now µi(z
∗)/wi > µh(z∗)/wh if and only if
u¯i(z
∗) =
∑
a∈AK
(ria−ρ¯i)maz∗ia
µi(z∗)
=
∑
a∈AK
(ria−ρ¯i)maz∗ia
wi
(
µi(z∗)
wi
) <
<
∑
a∈AK
(rha−ρ¯i)maz∗ha
wh
(
µh(z∗)
wh
) = ∑a∈AK(rha−ρ¯h)maz∗ha
µi(z∗)
= u¯h(z
∗) (20)
The fact that ln(x)ln(K) is a strictly increasing function in x explains the sec-
ond “iff” link. All the above arguments can be repeated by reversing the
inequalities, or by replacing them with the equality sign.
In the light of the above result we get back to the simple example and
apply our solution. The first example deals with a divorce.
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Example 1 (continued). A solution for the Egalitarian problem is the fol-
lowing:
ze =
[ 1.Green 2.Blue 3.Pink 4.Grey
A 1 0.8415 0 0
B 0 0.1585 1 1
]
(21)
A symmetry argument shows that another solution is obtained if the Pink
painting is assigned to agent A and the Blue painting is split so that a share
of 0.1585 (0.8415, resp.) goes to Agent A (Agent B, resp.).
If we compare market shares with average standardized ratings, we notice
that the smaller market share received by Agent A is compensated by a larger
gain over the central rating for the same agent.
Table 13: Characterization of our solution for Example 1
Agent Market sh. Gain
A 184.15 +1.81
B 215.85 +0.14
4.3 Legal applications
We proceed with two examples proposed by the Legal Workgroup of the
European project. Since the descriptions of the agents’ preferences were
rather succinct, we enriched them with some additional elements. If agents
were explicitly asked to rate the single goods, such fictional integration would
not be needed.
4.3.1 Application to divorce
A, wife of B, asks for the statement of termination of the civil
effects of the marriage, three years having passed since the judg-
ment of personal separation.
The goods in common are:
1. An apartment, used as a family home, worth 1,500,000 euros;
2. An apartment in a seaside resort worth 1,250,000 euros;
3. A prestigious building, inherited by the couple through testamentary
disposition, worth 1,750,000 euros;
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4. Valuable furniture (works of art) contained in the aforementioned
buildings for a value of 550,000 euros;
5. Two cars with a value of 60,000 and 50,000 euros, respectively;
6. A vintage car, worth 170,000 euros;
7. Company equity investments for a value of 750,000 euros;
8. A sum of money equal to 1,500,000 euros.
The spouses exercise both professional financial activities in the
risk capital market and are involved in several types of entrepreneurial
activities. For this reason, both have an interest in retaining
company holdings. The wife also asks for the sub-4 assets for
herself as part of her entrepreneurial activity involves the buying
and selling of works of art. For its part B requires the assignment
of works of art and vintage cars, as collectors.
We suppose that the wife is interested in the family house and has some
interest in the seaside resort apartment, while the husband has agreed to
live in the inherited apartment
Money (item 8) be either considered as an item of the division or it can
be distributed in equal parts between the parties. We opt for the second
option and, therefore, it is distributed equally to the two parties prior to
any other assignment.
Based on the short description, we figured out the ratings of the two
parties:
Table 14: The ratings for the divorce case
Item Market v. A’s ratings A’s utility B’s ratings B’s utility
1. Family Apt. 1500k FFFF 1650k FF 1364k
2. Seaside Apt. 1250k FFF 1250k FF 11136k
3. Inherited Apt. 1750k FF 1591k FFFF 1925k
4. Furniture 550k FFFFF 666k FFFF 605k
5. Two Cars 120k F 99k F 99k
6. Vintage Car 170k FF 155k FFFF 197k
7. Equity Inv. 750k FFFFF 908k FFFFF 908k
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The central ratings are
ρ¯A = 3.3850 ρ¯B = 3.2278.
The proposed division is the following:
z =
[ 1.FA 2.SA 3.IA 4.Fu 5.2C 6.VC 7.Eq
A 1 0.8336 0 1 0 0 0
B 0 0.1664 1 0 1 1 1
]
The following indices help define the quality of the division as perceived by
the two agents:
Table 15: Characterization of our solution for the divorce case
Agent Market v. Gain
A 3092k +0.48
B 2998k +0.80
As expected, the larger market share obtained by A, is compensated
by a slightly lower average standardized rating. We note that the sum of
money given to the two agents at the beginning of the procedure could be
used to assign the only split item to one of the agents. It seems reasonable
for agents A to buy the smaller share originally assigned to B.
4.3.2 Application to Company Law
The second example considers the liquidation of a company in which the
three partners are entitled to different shares.
A, B and C concluded a partnership contract in 2006, agreeing
to contribute their work and/or property to achieve a common
objective a small carpentry factory and a store for selling goods.
They had different stakes/contributions which would determine
their shares as joint owners. A was a carpenter with experience
especially in kitchens and bedrooms. He contributed equipment
(valued at 35000 euros) and of course with his know-how and
experience. B had business premises large enough for the factory
and for the store, and this was his contribution. C contributed in
cash 30000 euros. After the financial crisis, the business began
to deteriorate so person B proposed to change the purpose of
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their business to stocking and selling electronic appliances which
would be directly imported from China. B still thinks that he is
the only one who can decide about the purpose of the business
premises. A was disappointed because they didnt need him or
his work anymore. C only cares about profit. The content of
their common asset (joint ownership) changed during the decade.
They bought new machinery but they also had a special website
for selling furniture with the possibility of on-line interior design
as an additional service. To set up this website they had to
spend 4500 euros and they pay 1200 euros monthly for software
licenses and website maintenance fees. They decided to dissolve
the joint ownership and the first step that court had to make
was determining their shares. The court decided that A has 3/9,
B has 5/9 and C 1/9 of the business. By determination of their
shares joint-ownership was transformed into co-ownership. At
the dissolution of co-ownership (in May 2016) the assets consist
of all of the above mentioned but also includes new machinery
(valued at 20000 Euros, store items valued at 30000 euros, and
a profit of 15000 Euros).
In the process of partitioning co-ownership, A wants all machin-
ery, but also a part of the property where the factory was located
because he wants to continue running the same business by him-
self. B wants a part of the profits to start with his idea and all
business premises. He is also interested in the website because he
wants to sell online. C is interested in money only and proposes
to sell the business as a whole.
The three partners agree on a value of 25000 euros for the website. Also,
agents agree to leave money as one of the disputed items. Here is a list
of the items, their value and ratings by the partners compatible with their
statements.
The central ratings are
ρ¯A = 3.1898 ρ¯B = 3.7135 ρ¯C = 2.0737
The algortihm proposes the following division:
z =

1.Eq 2.BP 3.Ma 4.SI 5.We 6.Ca
A 0 0.2488 1 1 0 0
B 0.9162 0.7512 0 0 1 0
C 0.0838 0 0 0 0 1

26
Table 16: The ratings for the company law case
Item Market v. A B C
1. Equipment 35k F FF FFF
2. Business Pr. 70k FFFFF FFFFF F
3. Machinery 20k FFFF FF 1FFF
4. Store Items 30k FF FF F
5. Website 25k F FFFFF FF
6. Money 15k FFF FFFF FFFFF
The following indices characterize the division.
Table 17: Characterization of the solution for the company law case
Agent Weight Market V. MV/W Gain
A 1/3 67.416 202.248 +0.25659
B 5/9 109.651 197.372 +0.49424
C 1/9 17.933 161.397 +2.6242
As guaranteed by Theorem 1, whereas in the market value over the
weight ratio A ranks first, B second and C third, this order is totally reversed
when the gain over central rating is considered. In particular, C will discount
the fact of receiving her most treasured item with a lower share of goods in
terms market value.
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